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Abstract
In this paper we introduce an abstract theory of norma-
tive reasoning, whose central notion is the generation
of obligations, permissions and institutional facts from
conditional norms. We present various semantics and
their proof systems. The theory can be used to classify
and compare new candidates for standards of normative
reasoning, and to explore more elaborate forms of nor-
mative reasoning than studied thus far.
Introduction
The modal logic framework has been the standard for nor-
mative reasoning since Von Wright (1951) wrote his influ-
ential paper “deontic logic” sixty years ago. It has been
plagued by many counterintuitive or “paradoxical” theo-
rems, it has been extended, for example with action and
time (von Wright 1963) or conditionals (Hansson 1969),
and adapted, for example to minimal deontic logic (Chellas
1980). Makinson (1999) criticizes the hegemony of modal
logic and proposes an alternative iterative approach. In the
handbook of deontic logic (Gabbay et al. To appear a),
which is currently in preparation, the classical modal logic
framework is mainly confined to the historical chapter. A
chapter presents the alternatives to the modal framework,
and three chapters discuss concrete approaches, namely in-
put/output logic (Makinson and van der Torre 2000; 2001;
2003a), the imperativist approach (Hansen 2006), and the
algebraic conceptual implication structures or cis approach
(Lindahl and Odelstad 2003). There are also other candi-
dates for a new standard, such as nonmonotonic logic (Horty
1993) or deontic update semantics (van der Torre and Tan
1999).
With this rise of candidates for new standards for norma-
tive reasoning, the need emerges to have a common frame-
work to compare and analyze these new proposals. Lindahl
and Odelstad’s cis approach seems to be the most abstract,
but it does not seem to cover the wide range of deontic logics
covered by the input/output logic framework or the impera-
tivist approach, which are extensions of propositional logic
and provide a range of proof systems. We therefore study the
following question:
Copyright c© 2012, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
Research question. How to build an abstract framework
for normative reasoning, of which the cis, input/output,
and imperativist approaches are instances?
The success criterion of our research question is that it cov-
ers a wide range of topics discussed in the first volume of
the handbook of deontic logic (Gabbay et al. To appear a),
namely:
Conditionals and rules, we do not restrict ourselves to
monadic approaches, but also capture dyadic ones.
Contrary to duties, well known from deontic paradoxes
(Chisholm 1963; Forrester 1984), must be represented
without generation of counterintuitive conclusions.
Dilemmas and defeasibility, if two norms give contradic-
tory advice, then we must to be able to reason with these
two alternatives and their consequences.
Permissive norms must be represented explicitly and used
to generate permissions.
Constitutitive norms, such as count-as conditionals, must
be represented explicitly, and used to generate institu-
tional facts (Boella and van der Torre 2004).
Makinson and van der Torre (2000) do not to introduce a
single system of normative reasoning, but a framework for
many systems. We follow this tradition. Our methodology
is both semantic and proof theoretic. The starting point is a
combination of Lindahl and Odelstad’s cis approach for the
high level of abstraction, and Makinson and van der Torre’s
input/output logic for the proof systems. Whereas Makinson
and van der Torre start from propositional logic, in this paper
we stay at the abstract level. The proof systems are based on
acceptance and redundancy (van der Torre and Tan 1999;
van der Torre 2010). We focus on the conceptual framework
and the results, and leave the proofs to a technical report.
We do not address the topics discussed in the second vol-
ume of the handbook of deontic logic (Gabbay et al. To ap-
pear b), such as time, action, norm change, epistemic norms,
games, etc.
The layout of this paper is as follows. We address the five
issues to be incorporated, where we deal with contrary-to-
duty and dilemmas in the same section. We introduce se-
mantics, proof systems, and completeness results, illustrated
by examples.
Example
Abstract norms can refer to propositions, like “there should
not be a fence,” modal propositions like “you should know
whether there is a fence,” or actions like “you should not
build a fence.” An advantage of abstract norms is that we
can reason even when we do not detail the content of norms,
as we discuss below. We illustrate the representation, seman-
tics and proof systems of abstract normative systems by an
example of Cottage Regulations visualized in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Cottage Regulations.
Representation
This figure must be read as follows. A circle visualizes two
atomic elements, for example the light part of f represents
that there is a fence, and the dark part represents that there
is no fence. An arrow is a conditional norm, with straight
arrows representing constitutive norms like “a legal cottage
contract (l) counts as owning the cottage (o),” dashed lines
representing regulative norms like “if you have an id card (i),
then you must keep it with you (k),” and dotted lines are per-
missive norms like “if you own a cottage (o), then you may
sell it (s).” Finally, the example contains a context of ele-
ments that are assumed to hold, namely the contract to buy
the cottage is signed electronically (e), there is a cottage (c)
and there is dog (d). Note that if there is a cottage (c), then
there should not be a fence (f ), since the arrow hits the dark
side of the fence element.
Constitutive norms define legal concepts like ownership,
which are also called institutional facts to distinguish them
from brute facts like the existence of a fence, or the physical
act of signing a contract. The example contains two consti-
tutive norms: “an electronically signed cottage contract (e)
counts as a legal cottage contract (l)” and “a legal cottage
contract counts as owning the cottage (o).” The regulations
prescribe that a person living in a cottage (c) must follow
these norms: “dogs (d) are not allowed,” “the cottage should
not have a fence (f),” “if there is a dog, then there must be
a fence,” “if there is a fence, then it must be white (w),” “if
someone owns a cottage (o), then he (or she) must have an
id card (i),” “if someone does not own a cottage, then he (or
she) must have an id card” and “if someone has an id card,
then he (or she) must keep it with him (or her) (k).” The ex-
ample presents only one permissive norm: “the owner of a
cottage is allowed to sell it (s).”
Reasoning: semantics
The meaning of a normative system is represented by the
institutional facts, obligations and permissions which can be
generated from the constitutive, regulative and permissive
norms respectively. A semantics generates the institutional
fact that there is a legal contract (l), and the obligation there
should be no fence (f), directly from the context using a
single norm. This is known as factual detachment.
Transitivity Semantics may disagree on the amount of
transitivity they allow. For example, can the institutional fact
that there is a legal contract (l) itself be used to generate also
the institutional fact that we own the cottage (o), and can we
use the institutional fact that we own the cottage (o) gener-
ate the strong permission to sell the house (s)? Likewise, if
there is a dog, then there is the obligation to have a fence (f),
and can we generate from this obligation that there must be
a white fence (w)? The latter generation is known as deontic
detachment.
Reasoning by cases A second distinction is whether a se-
mantics supports reasoning by cases. Consider the id card (i)
in Figure 1. It becomes obligatory to have an id card if we
own the cottage (o) as well as if we do not own the cottage.
Using reasoning by cases we can generate an obligation to
have an id card in every context.
Dilemmas and defeasibility The cottage (c) and the
dog (d) are part of the context and make the existence of
a fence (f) both obliged and forbidden. In some systems
this would lead to explosion in the sense that everything be-
comes obligatory. With multiple obligation sets, we can use
subsets of the norms to derive sets of obligations without
complementary pairs. In this case we have on the one hand
that there must be a fence (because there is a dog), and it
must be a white fence, and on the other hand that it is for-
bidden to have a fence (since there is a cottage).
Violations and contrary-to-duty If we consider a case
where there is a fence, and thus (f) would be part of the
context, then we would have the obligation to not have a
fence just outside the context which represents a violation.
The obligation to have a white fence (w) must be fulfilled in
case the obligation not to have a fence is violated.
Reasoning: proof system
At first sight, it may seem that the generation of obligations
from norms itself is a proof system. However, how to dis-
tinguish different ways to generate them, and how to prove
soundness and completeness with such a proof theory?
The proof systems in this paper are based on equivalence
of abstract normative systems. If adding the norm that al-
ways there should be an id card (i), by adding a dashed
arrow from (>) in the context to (i), does not change the
semantics, in other words if we can still generate the same
obligations, permissions and institutional facts, then we de-
rive the norm. Likewise if the addition of the constitutive
norm that “if we sign the contract (e), then we own the cot-
tage (o)” does not change the semantics, then we derive this
norm.
Rules and Conditionals
Abstract normative system
Makinson and van der Torre (2000) represent rules by or-
dered pairs (a, x), where the body a is thought of as an input,
representing some condition or situation, and the head x is
thought of as an output, representing what the rule tells us to
be desirable, obligatory or whatever in that situation. They
quickly move to what they call the logical level, where the
universe contains all sentences of a logical language, and in
particular they study propositional logic.
We study their abstract level, to which we add two ideas.
First, each element in the universe comes with its “anti-
element.” This is the minimal extension to represent viola-
tions, namely elements in the input whose anti-element is
in the output. Second, there is an element in the universe
called >, contained in every context. We consider only a fi-
nite universe in this paper.
Definition 1 (Universe L) Given a finite set of atomic ele-
ments E, the universe L is E ∪ {∼e | e ∈ E} ∪ {>}. For
e ∈ E, let a =∼e iff a = e, a = e iff a =∼e, and undefined
iff a = >.
An abstract normative system is a directed graph, and a
context is a set of nodes of the graph containing >.
Definition 2 (ANS 〈L,N〉) An abstract normative system
ANS is a pair 〈L,N〉 with N ⊆ L × L a set of conditional
norms, and a context A ⊆ L is a subset of the universe such
that > ∈ A.
In a context, an abstract normative system generates or
produces an obligation set, a subset of the universe, reflect-
ing the obligatory elements of the universe.
Definition 3 (Deontic operation©) The deontic opera-
tion © is a function from an abstract normative sys-
tem 〈L,N〉 and a context A to a subset of the universe
©(〈L,N〉, A) ⊆ L. Since L is always clear from context,
we write©(N,A) for©(〈L,N〉, A).
Semantics
Simple-minded output or ©1 is Makinson and van der
Torre’s minimal system. Basic output or©2 allows for rea-
soning by cases, which now means that if something is
obligatory in the context of a and its complement a, then
it is obligatory also in the minimal context. Reusable out-
put or ©3 allows for deontic detachment, which now cor-
responds to iteration of the rules. Throughput or ©+i al-
lows for identity. All possible combinations lead to eight
input/output operations.
Definition 4 (Eight deontic operations) A context A ⊆ L
is complete if for all e ∈ E, it contains either e or e (or
both).
©1(N,A) = N(A) = {x | (a, x) ∈ N for some a ∈ A}
©2(N,A) = ∩{N(V ) | A ⊆ V, V complete}
©3(N,A) = ∩{N(B) | A ⊆ B ⊇ N(B)}
©4(N,A) = ∩{N(V ) | A ⊆ V ⊇ N(V ), V complete}
©+i (N,A) =©i(N ∪ {(a, a) | a ∈ L}, A)
Equivalently, we can define ©3(N,A) as N(B) where
B is the smallest set containing A and closed under N ,
i.e.A ⊆ B ⊇ N(B). Moreover, to emphasize symmetry, we
can define©1(N,A) equivalently as ∩{N(B)|A ⊆ B}.
Proposition 1 (Inclusion among deontic operations) We
have ©1(N,A) ⊆ ©2(N,A) ⊆ ©4(N,A) (reasoning
by cases), ©1(N,A) ⊆ ©3(N,A) ⊆ ©4(N,A) (deontic
detachment), and©i(N,A) ⊆ ©+i (N,A) (throughput).
Reasoning 
by cases
Deontic 
detachment
Throughput
The following example illustrates that the eight deontic
operations are all distinct.
Example 1 Let N = {(o, i), (o, i), (i, k)}, as visualized in
Figure 2. Notice that we are considering a fragment of the
example represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 2: Both o and o make i obligatory (Example 1).
The tables compare the obligation sets for the two contexts
A = {>} and A = {o,>} for all eight deontic operations.
A ©1(N,A) ©2(N,A) ©3(N,A) ©4(N,A)
{>} {} {i} {} {i, k}
{o,>} {i} {i} {i, k} {i, k}
A ©+1 (N,A) ©+2 (N,A) ©+3 (N,A) ©+4 (N,A)
{>} {} {i} {} {i, k}
{o,>} {o, i} {o, i} {o, i, k} {o, i, k}
E.g., ©2(N, {>}) = {i} can be calculated by taking all
64 complete contexts V , of which the ones without comple-
mentary pairs are given in the table below, and calculate the
associated N(V ), which gives {i} as their intersection.
V N [V ] V N [V ]
{o, i, k,>} {i, k} {o, i, k,>} {i, k}
{o, i, k,>} {i, k} {o, i, k,>} {i, k}
{o, i, k,>} {i} {o, i, k,>} {i}
{o, i, k,>} {i} {o, i, k,>} {i}
©3(N, {o,>}) = ∩{N(B)|B ∈ {{o, i, k,>}, . . . L}}={i, k},
since the only B containing a and satisfying the constraint
that N(B) ⊆ B are B = {o, i, k,>} and its supersets.
Proof systems
A pair (a, x) of formulae is derivable using rules from a
set N of such pairs iff (a, x) is in the least set that in-
cludesN , and is closed under the rules. In the particular case
of simple-minded output, we use the core rule Strengthening
of the Input (SI) determining an operation d1. In the case of
basic output, we add Disjunction (OR) to it, obtaining an
operation d2. In the case of reusable output, we add Transi-
tivity (T) instead of (OR), obtaining an operation d3. In the
case of reusable basic output, we add both (OR) and (T) to
the duo, obtaining an operation d4. Finally, for each di we
add Identity (ID) to obtain the throughput variant d+i .
Definition 5 (Derivability d) d1(N) (d2(N) / d3(N) /
d4(N)) is the smallest set containing N and closed under SI
(SI+OR / SI+T / SI+OR+T). Moreover, d+i (N) is the small-
est set containing N and closed under the rules of di to-
gether with ID:
(>, x)
(a, x)
SI
(a, x) (a, x)
(>, x) OR
(a, x) (x, y)
(a, y)
T
(a, a)
ID
Example 2 We refine Example 1 by replacing (o, i) by (o, z)
and (z, i) where z means: “to have a legal mail address.”
Let N = {(o, i)(o, z)(z, i)(i, k)} and A = {>} as visual-
ized in Figure 3.
Context
o i
z k
T
Figure 3: Using©4, y is obligatory (Examples 2 and 3).
The following two derivations show y ∈ d4(N,A). The
non-repetition derivation (i) uses each premise at most once,
and the universal order derivation (ii) uses the transitivity
rule T only before the disjunction rule OR. Non-repetition
and universal order properties are used by Makinson and
van der Torre in their completeness proofs.
(i) Non-repetition derivation: premises used at most once
(o, x)
(o, z) (z, i)
T
(o, i)
OR
(>, i) (i, k)
T
(>, k)
(ii) Universal order derivation: T only before OR
(o, i) (i, k)
T
(o, k)
(o, z) (z, i)
T
(o, i) (i, k)
T
(o, k)
OR
(>, k)
Theorem 1 shows the soundness and completeness of the
eight proof systems with respect to the corresponding deon-
tic operations. This completeness result is phrased in an un-
usual way to deal with the abstract nature of the normative
systems, but the deeper structure is similar to more standard
completeness results. More precisely, there are two chal-
lenges to define a proof system and completeness theorem
for an abstract normative system, here as well as in the fol-
lowing sections:
1. Analogously to the completeness result of input/output
logic, repeated as Theorem 3 later in this paper, deon-
tic operations based on obligation sets must be related to
proof systems based on conditionals. As in input/output
logic, the intuition is that x ∈ ©(N, {a}) if and only if
(a, x) ∈ d(N).
2. The deontic operations are defined for a context being a
set, whereas the antecedent of a conditional is a single for-
mula. Since we are in an abstract setting, in contrast to the
input/output logic framework we cannot use conjunction
to join elements of the context.
For the second challenge, we adopt the following idea. In
classical logic, it is well known that if a set of formulas S
implies a formula φ, we may equivalently that S is equiva-
lent to S ∪ {φ}. For example, this is how a Boolean algebra
is defined. This idea has been further explored in dynamic
semantics such as deontic update semantics (van der Torre
and Tan 1999), where – using the terminology of this pa-
per – a normative system N accepts the norm (a, x) if and
only if adding the norm (a, x) to N does not change the
obligation set, i.e. ∀A : ©(N,A) = ©(N ∪ {(a, x)}, A).
In other words, the idea is that equivalence of normative sys-
tems replaces implication as the basic notion. Likewise, van
der Torre (2010) studies when a norm (a, x) ∈ N is redun-
dant, in the sense that it can be removed from N without
changing the obligation set. The same idea is used here to
establish the relation between the deontic operations and the
proof systems.
Theorem 1 (Completeness) For all deontic operations
© ∈ {©i,©+i | i = 1, . . . , 4} and corresponding proof
systems d ∈ {di, d+i | i = 1, . . . , 4} we have:
(a, x) ∈ d(N) iff ∀A :©(N,A) =©(N ∪ {(a, x)}, A)
Example 3 (continued from Example 2) We have again
N = {(o, i)(o, z)(z, i)(i, k)} and A = {>}. From
k ∈ d4(N,A) and the completeness theorem, we can deduce
∀B :©(N,B) =©(N ∪ {(>, k)}, B), and consequently
k ∈ ©4(N,A). This can also be verified as follows. From
the complete contexts built from {o, i, z, k, o, i, z, k,>},
only {o, i, z, k,>}, {o, i, z, k,>}, {o, i, z, k,>} and their
extensions satisfy N(V ) ⊆ V . N(V ) is {i, k}, {i, k} and
{i, z, k} respectively, and ©4(N,A) is their intersection
{i, k}.
Dilemmas and contrary-to-duties
At least since the work of Horty (1993), nonmonotonic tech-
niques have been used to deal with reasoning in the con-
text of dilemmas, contrary-to-duty reasoning, and defeasible
norms.
Dilemmas are two (or more) obligations with contradictory
content, like the obligation for a and the obligation for a.
Contrary-to-duty or secondary obligations (a, x) are in
force only in case of violation of a primary obligation,
e.g., generated using (>, a).
Defeasible deontic logic is concerned with violations and
exceptions (van der Torre 1997; Nute 1997).
A typical consequence of Horty’s approach is that there is
no longer necessarily a single obligation set, but there may
be several of them. We do not have to change the definition
of abstract normative system ANS, but we have to change
the definition of deontic operation. We write
⊙
for deontic
operations that may have multiple obligation sets.
Definition 6 (Deontic operation
⊙
) The deontic opera-
tion
⊙
is a function from an abstract normative sys-
tem 〈L,N〉 and a context A to a set of subsets of the
universe
⊙
(〈L,N〉, A) ⊆ 2L. We write ⊙(N,A) for⊙
(〈L,N〉, A).
The following example illustrates a use of multiple obli-
gation sets.
Example 4 Let N = {(>, x), (>, x), (x, y), (x, y)} and
context A = {>} visualized in Figure 4. The two obligation
sets {x, y} and {x, y} represent two deontic alternatives.
Context
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Figure 4: Dilemma with two alternatives (Example 4 and 7).
Horty uses Reiter’s default logic, which has the draw-
back that it is a throughput operation, i.e., it satisfies iden-
tity. Makinson and van der Torre define a deontic operation
of constrained output via the definition of maximal sets of
norms, under a consistency constraint. In our abstract set-
ting, for each deontic operation ©, we define an opera-
tion
⊙∗ with the output constraint that there is no com-
plementary pair in the output (for dilemmas) and an oper-
ation
⊙
with the input/output constraint that there is no
complementary pair if we combine the input with the out-
put (for dilemmas and contrary-to-duty reasoning).
⊙∗ is
defined using the m∗i (N,A) operation, selecting the maxi-
mal subsets of N that do not return complementary pairs in
the output, and
⊙
is defined using the mi(N,A) operation
considering both the input and the output. For throughput
operations the output and the input/output constraint coin-
cide, but in general this is not the case, leading to twelve
distinct operations.
Definition 7 (Twelve deontic operations) Let coh(A) be
true if and only if A does not contain a complementary pair
{a, a}, and let © ∈ {©i,©+i | i = 1, . . . , 4}. Given an
abstract normative system 〈L,N〉 and a context A, maximal
rules sets m∗i (N,A) and mi(N,A) are as follows:
m∗(N,A) = max⊆{N ′ ⊆ N |coh(©(N ′, A))}
m(N,A) = max⊆{N ′ ⊆ N |coh(A ∪©(N ′, A))}
The deontic operations
⊙∗ and⊙ are as follows:⊙∗
(N,A) = {©(N ′, A)|N ′ ∈ m∗(N,A)}⊙
(N,A) = {©(N ′, A)|N ′ ∈ m(N,A)}
We illustrate the new operations by several examples. The
following example of Mo¨bius strip (Makinson 1999) illus-
trates the difference between the output and input/output
constraint, and that obligation sets do not have to be max-
imal.
Example 5 (Mo¨bius strip) N = {(a, x), (x, y), (y, a)}
and context A = {a,>},
• m∗(N,A) = {N} and⊙∗3(N,A) = {{x, y, a}},
• m(N,A) = {{(a, x), (x, y)}, {(a, x), (y, a)}, {(x, y), (y, a)}}
and
⊙
3(N,A) = {{x, y}, {x}, {}}.
Context
x
y
T
a
Figure 5: The Mo¨bius strip (Example 5).
(Chisholm 1963)’s paradox illustrates that adding a tran-
sitive closure may change the output for
⊙
3.
Example 6 (Chisholm set) N = {(>, a), (a, t), (a, t)},
and A = {a,>} as visualized in Figure 6, where a stands
for a man going to the assistance of his neighbors and t for
telling them that he will come. We have
⊙
3(N,A) = {{t}}
and
⊙
3(N ∪ {(>, t)}, A) = {{t}, {t}}, thus adding the
transitive closure leads to a new obligation set. We do have⊙∗
3(N,A) = {{a, t}, {a, t}} and
⊙∗
3(N ∪ {(>, t)}, A) =
{{a, t}, {a, t}}.
Context
a
t
T
Figure 6: Chisholm’s paradox (Example 6).
Moreover, the following example illustrates that also
for
⊙∗
3, adding the transitive closure may change the out-
put.
Example 7 Consider N = {(>, x), (>, x), (x, y), (x, y)}
and A = {>} from Example 4, visualized in Fig-
ure 4. We have
⊙∗
3(N,A) = {{x, y}, {x, y}} and⊙∗
3(N ∪ {(>, y)}, A) = {{x, y}, {x, y}, {x, y}}, thus
adding the transitive closure adds the third obligation set.
The following example illustrates operation
⊙
3.
Example 8 N = {(a, x), (x, y), (x, y)}. We have for A =
{a,>} that m(N,A) = {{(a, x), (x, y), (x, y)}} and⊙
3 = {{x, y}}, for A = {a, x,>} that m(N,A) ={{(x, y), (x, y)}} and⊙3 = {{y}}, and in general it can
be shown that we have ∀A : ⊙3(N,A) = ⊙3(N ∪{(a, y)}, A).
Assume N = {(a, x), (x, y), (x, y), (y, x)} and A =
{a,>}. We have m(N,A) = {{(a, x), (x, y), (x, y)},
Context
x yT
a
Figure 7: Reasoning by cases (Example 8).
{(a, x), (x, y), (y, x)}, {(x, y), (x, y), (y, x)}}, and there-
fore
⊙
3(N,A) = {{x, y}, {x}, {}}.
Assume now N ′ = {(a, x), (x, y), (x, y), (y, x), (a, y)}
and A = {a,>}. We have m(N ′, A) =
{{(a, x), (x, y), (x, y), (a, y)}, {(a, x), (x, y), (y, x)},
{(x, y), (x, y), (y, x)}}, ⊙∗2(N ′, a) ={{x, y}, {x}, {y, x}}, and thus ⊙3(N) 6= ⊙3(N ∪{(a, y)}).
Many more semantics could be studied, for example,
based on maximization of the obligation sets rather than
maximizing norms in the function m, as in (Horty 1993),
introducing priorities among the norms, or introducing a
causal reasoning principle (Bochman 2005). Since we fo-
cus on completeness theorems in this paper, we leave these
variants for further research, and we turn to proof systems.
Proof system
For
⊙∗, compared to©, the rules SI and ID still hold, but
T no longer holds. Consequently, the proof systems for
⊙∗
1
and
⊙∗
3 may be the same, and likewise for
⊙∗
2 and
⊙∗
4.
For
⊙
we have the same properties as for
⊙∗, with in
addition the new rule Violation (∼) for all deontic operators.
(a, a)
∼
If we define the completeness theorem analogously to
Theorem 1, then the proof system would have to be non-
monotonic. We do not study this issue here. We just ob-
serve that we may enforce monotonicity in N by consid-
ering equivalence under addition of norms, in the follow-
ing way. For all deontic operations
⊙ ∈ {⊙i,⊙+i | i =
1, . . . , 4} and corresponding proof systems δ ∈ {δi, δ+i |
i = 1, . . . , 4} we have ∀A ⊆ L∀M ⊆ L× L:
(a, x) ∈ δ(N) iff⊙(N ∪M,A) =⊙(N ∪M ∪ {(a, x)}, A)
Permissions
We consider two of the three kinds of permissions studied
by Makinson and van der Torre (2003a), because these are
the only deontic logics for strong permissions we know of,
which come with a proof system.
Negative permission
A negative permission operation is defined analogously to a
deontic operation.
Definition 8 (Negative permission operation) The nega-
tive permission operation P− is a function from an ab-
stract normative system and a context to a subset of the
universe P−(〈L,N〉, A) ⊆ L. We write P−(L,A) for
P−(〈L,N〉, A).
Something is negatively permitted if it is not explicitly
forbidden.
Definition 9 (Negative permission) Let © be a deontic
operation and P− a negative permission operation.
• x ∈ P−(N,A) iff x /∈ ©(N,A)
We use Makinson and van der Torre (2003a)’s running
example to illustrate our operations.
Example 9 N = {(work, tax)}.
A P−1 (N,A)
{>} {tax, tax, work, work}
{work,>} {tax, work, work}
In context {>}, we have©(N, {>}) = {}, so everything is
negatively permitted.
Properties
Makinson and van der Torre show that so-called inverse
rules hold for negative permission in input/output logic, and
the following proposition illustrates similar properties in our
abstract setting, obtained by inverting the proof rules of©.
Proposition 2 The following property holds for all eight
negative permission operations.
x ∈ P−(N,A)
x ∈ P−(N,>)SI
−1
However, as Makinson and van der Torre observe, it is not
clear how these properties could lead to a characterization of
P− as the closure of some basis under the rules, for it is not
clear what the basis could be.
Static positive permission
Positive permissions are explicitly permitted by the rules. To
formalize positive permissions, we need a set P of explicit
permissive norms, along with the set N of explicit obliga-
tions.
Definition 10 (ANSP ) An abstract normative system with
permissive norms ANSP is a triple 〈L,N, P 〉 with N,P ⊆
L×L two sets of conditional norms. To distinguish permis-
sive norms from obligations, we write them as <a, x>.
Definition 11 (Positive permission operation) The posi-
tive permission operation P 0 is a function from an abstract
normative system with permissive norms 〈L,N, P 〉 and a
contextA to a subset of the universe P 0(〈L,N, P 〉, A) ⊆ L.
In the line of Von Wright’s later approach, Makinson and
van der Torre say that there is a static positive permission
to realize x in context A if x is generated under these con-
ditions either by the norms in N alone, or the norms in N
together with a single explicit permission in P .
Definition 12 (Static positive permission) Let© be a de-
ontic operation and P 0 a positive permission operation.
• x ∈ P 0(N,P,A) iff x ∈ ©(N∪Q,A) for some singleton
or empty Q ⊆ P
Example 10 (continued from Example 9) Besides norm
N = {(work, tax)}, we have two explicit permissive norms
P = {<18y, vote>,<18y, work>} visualized in Figure 8.
A P 01 (N,P,A) P
0
3 (N,P,A)
{>} − −
{work,>} {tax} {tax}
{18y,>} {vote, work} {vote, work, tax}
In context {>} and using P 01 , no positive permissions
are derived. In context {work,>} we have {tax} ∈
©1(N ∪ Q,A) with Q = ∅. In context {18y,>} we de-
rive {vote, work} using Q = {<18y, vote>} and Q =
{<18y, work>} respectively. Using P 03 , also tax is derived.
Context
v w18 tT
Figure 8: Combining N and P norms (Examples 10 - 11).
Proof system
Proof systems for permissions presuppose a proof system for
obligations. The so-called subverse proof rules (Makinson
and van der Torre 2003a) are derived from proof rules of©,
where the conclusion and one of the premises is replaced by
a corresponding permission.
Definition 13 Given d(N), p1(N,P ) / p2(N,P ) /
p3(N,P ) is the smallest set containing P and closed under
OP and SI↓ (OP+SI↓+OR↓ / OP+SI↓+T ↓1+T ↓2):
(a, x)
<a, x>
OP
<>, x>
<a, x>
SI↓
(a, x)<a, x>
<>, x> OR
↓
(a, x)<x, y>
<a, y>
T ↓1
<a, x>(x, y)
<a, y>
T ↓2
For throughput, the same holds, when d+(N) is used.
Example 11 (continued) <18y, tax> ∈ p3(N,P ) as a
consequence of rule T ↓2.
The completeness theorem is defined in the same spirit
as Theorem 1 for obligations, and proven using a non-
repetition lemma in the same way as the completeness theo-
rems of (Makinson and van der Torre 2003a).
Theorem 2 (Completeness) For all permission operations
P 0 ∈ {P 0i , P 0+i | i = 1 . . . 3} and corresponding proof
systems p ∈ {pi, p+i | i = 1 . . . 3} we have:
∀A : P 0(N,P,A) = P 0(N,P∪{(a, x)}, A) iff (a, x) ∈ p(N,P )
We conjecture that for some derivations there is no proof
that allows non repetition usage of norms as shown in the
following example.
Example 12 Assume N = {(b, x), (b, y), (y, b)} and from
the rules we want to derive (>, x).
(b, y)
(y, b) (b, x)
T
(y, x)
T
(b, x) (b, x)
OR
(>, x)
The rule (b, x) is used twice; first in the starting T deriva-
tion and second in the last OR.
Though the failure of the completeness proof of P4 is on
the one hand disappointing, on the other hand it is reassur-
ing to find that the same behavior of permission under in-
put/output logic is shown here again at the abstract level.
Constitutive Norms
Constitutive norms are usually represented as so-called
count-as conditionals “X counts as Y in the context Z”
(Searle 1969). However, a drawback of this representation is
that there is no consensus on the representation of the con-
text. Lindahl and Odelstad (2003) abstract from the context
and represent constitutive norms as rules “X counts as Y ,”
in the same way as regulative norms are represented. Boella
and van der Torre (2006) use the same framework for con-
stitutive norms deriving institutional facts, as they use for
regulative norms deriving obligations. Here we also use the
abstract normative system in Definition 1 for constitutive
norms generating institutional facts, we call the correspond-
ing operation I for institutional fact operation.
In particular, we are interested in the interaction among
regulative and constitutive norms, just like in the previous
section on positive permissions we were interested in the in-
teraction among regulative and permissive norms.
Definition 14 (ANSC) An abstract normative system with
constitutive norms ANSC is a triple 〈L,N,C〉 with N,C ⊆
L× L two sets of conditional norms.
Definition 15 (IO operation) The combined IO operation
is a function from an abstract normative system with consti-
tutive norms 〈L,N,C〉 and a context A to a subset of the
universe IO(〈L,N,C〉, A) ⊆ 2L. To distinguish the kinds
of norms, we write [a, p] for constitutive norms, (p, x) for
regulative norms as before, and [a, x) for the combined op-
eration.
Semantics
Lindahl and Odelstad use constitutive norms to generate a
particular kind of institutional facts, called intermediate con-
cepts. Their combination is visualized in Figure 9 consider-
ing Example 13. The context of the combined system con-
sists of so called brute facts A, which are used to generate
the input I of the regulative norms N . This input consists of
institutional facts intermediate between the two black boxes
of constitutive C and regulative norms N . The output of the
regulative norms are again obligations and permissions O.
In Figure 1 we have brute facts like “the contract is signed
(e)” that leads to the intermediate concepts: “there is a legal
contract (l)” and “there is a cottage owner (o)”.
C
[b,p]
N
(a,x)
(p,y)
IA O
{a,b,T} {x,y}{p}
Figure 9: Logical Architecture
We consider two options of the combined operation.
Definition 16 Let I be an institutional fact operation and
© a deontic operation.
• ∗(N,C,A) =©(N, {>} ∪ I(C,A))
• (N,C,A) =©(N,A ∪ I(C,A))
The following example illustrates the difference between
the two operations ∗ and .
Example 13 Given N = {(a, x)(p, y)}, C = {[b, p]} and
A = {a, b,>} as visualized in Figure 9 and 10. Consider
the following two choices for I and©:
• I3 and ©3. We have ∗(N,C,A) = {y} because
I3(C,A) = {p} and O3(N, {p,>}) = {y}, and
(N,C,A) = {x, y} because I3(C,A) = {p} and
O3(N, {a, b, p,>}) = {x, y}.
• I+3 and ©3. We have ∗(N,C,A) = {x, y} because
I+3 (C,A) = {a, b, p} and O3(N, {a, b, p,>}) = {x, y},
and (N,C,A) = {x, y} because I+3 (C,A) = {a, b, p}
and O3(N, {a, b, p,>}) = {x, y}.
Consequently, if the desired output is {x, y}, then we can
use either ∗ with throughput, or .
Context x
p y
T
a b
Figure 10: Combining N and C (Examples 13 and 14).
Proof systems
As far as we know, no proof systems have been developed
thus far for logical architectures. There seem to be various
questions one could pursue. First, one could describe the be-
havior of ∗ and  in terms of the behavior of I and O,
together with bridge rules.
Definition 17 Given dI(C) for constitutive norms and
dO(N) for regulative norms, dIO∗(C,N) (dIO(C,N)) is
the smallest set containing dI(C), dO(N) and closed under
IO1 (IO1 and IO2):
[a, p] (p, x)
[a, x)
IO1
(a, x)
[a, x)
IO2
Example 14 (Continued) N = {(a, x)(p, y)} and C =
{[b, p]}. With∗ and throughput for I , we derive [a, x) from
(a, x) using ID and IO1 as follows:
ID
[a, a] (a, x)
IO1
[a, x)
With , we can derive it directly using IO2.
However, it is less clear how we can define a completeness
theorem for a semantics using this proof system.
Another kind of proof system for the logical architecture
in Figure 9 could be based on the idea that one is only inter-
ested in the input/output behavior of the whole system, and
therefore not in the intermediate concepts. In other words,
the underlying notion of equivalence of normative systems
could abstract away the institutional facts.
The system can be further developed by introducing both
permissive and constitutive norms in the same abstract nor-
mative system, and consider constraints for the constitutive
and permissive rules too. For example, Artosi et al. (2004)
argue that constitutive norms are defeasible. We do not pur-
sue this issue in this paper.
Instantiation
Explosion
To instantiate the ANS with propositional logic to obtain
a fragment of input/output logic, we have to deal with the
property that if an input or output is inconsistent, then it is
the whole languageL. In this section, we therefore make two
assumptions. First, if the context contains a complementary
pair, then it is equivalent to the universe. Moreover, if the
output contains a complementary pair, then it is the whole
universe.
Definition 18 (Eight deontic operations with explosion)
We assume that the context satisfies the property that if
a, a ∈ A, then A = L. Given an ANS 〈L,N〉 and context
A, N [A] = N(A) if there is no e ∈ E with e, e ∈ N(A),
N [A] = L otherwise.
O1(N,A) = N [A]
O2(N,A) = ∩{N [V ]|A ⊆ V, V complete}
O3(N,A) = ∩{N [B]|A ⊆ B ⊇ N [B]}
O4(N,A) = ∩{N [V ]|A ⊆ V ⊇ N [V ], V complete}
O+i (N,A) = Oi(N ∪ I, A)
We have that the following two inference rules hold:
(a, a) (b, x)
(a, x)
V
(a, x) (a, x)
(a, y)
⊥
Example 15 N = {(>, x), (a, x), (a, y), (b, y)}. The fol-
lowing derivation shows that z ∈ O2(N, {b,>}).
(>, x)
SI
(a, x) (a, x)
⊥
(a, y) (a, y)
OR
(>, y)
SI
(b, y) (b, y)
⊥
(b, z)
For negative permission we have that now⊥−1 holds (see
Proposition 2) and for positive permission that⊥↓ holds (see
Theorem 2).
x ∈ ©(N,A) y ∈ P−(N,A)
x ∈ P−(N,A) ⊥
−1 (a, x)<a, x>
<a, y>
⊥↓
Instantiation: input/output logic
To compare our abstract operations to the unconstrained
input/output operations, we repeat the relevant definitions
and theorems from the latter. Makinson and van der Torre
(2000) emphasize that this is a relatively simple setting,
abstracting from important aspects of deontic reasoning,
such as contrary-to-duty reasoning or permissions. These as-
pects are discussed in (Makinson and van der Torre 2001;
2003a), leading to much more involved input/output opera-
tions, which we discuss in following sections. The construc-
tion of the semantics is analogous to our abstract normative
systems, adding the closure of input and output under propo-
sitional consequence.
Definition 19 (out (Makinson and van der Torre 2000))
Let L be a propositional logic with Cn the consequence
operator of L, > a tautology of L, a complete set one that
is either maxiconsistent or equal to L, and let N be a set
of ordered pairs of L (called the generators). A generator
(a, x) is read as ‘if input a then output x’. The following
logical systems are defined:
out1(N,A) = Cn(N(Cn(A))
out2(N,A) = ∩{Cn(N(V )) : A ⊆ V, V complete}
out3(N,A) = ∩{Cn(N(B)) : A ⊆ B = Cn(B) ⊇ N(B)}
out4(N,A) = ∩{Cn(N(V )) : A ⊆ V ⊇ N(V ), V complete}
To emphasize the similarity between the two proof sys-
tems, we use the same names for the more general rules
of input/output logic as the names we used for the rules of
our abstract normative systems, since it is always clear from
context which rule we refer to. In addition, all proof sys-
tems satisfy Weakening of the Output (WO) and Conjunc-
tion (AND), and d3 and d4 satisfy Cumulative Transitiv-
ity (CT ).
Definition 20 (deriv (Makinson and van der Torre 2000))
Let L be a propositional logic with ` the derivibility relation
of L. deriv1(N) (deriv2(N) / deriv3(N) / deriv4(N))
is the smallest set containing N ∪ {(>,>)} and closed
under SI , WO and AND (SI+WO+AND+OR /
SI+WO+AND+CT / SI+WO+AND+OR+CT ), and
deriv+i (N) is the smallest set containining N ∪ {(>,>)}
and closed under the rules of derivi, and in addition ID:
(a, x) b ` a
(b, x)
SI
(a, x) x ` y
(a, y)
WO
(a, x) (a, y)
(a, x ∧ y) AND
(a, x) (b, x)
(a ∨ b, x) OR
(a, x) (a ∧ x, y)
(a, y)
CT
(a, a)
ID
Theorem 3 ((Makinson and van der Torre 2000)) For all
out ∈ {outi, out+i | i = 1, . . . , 4} and deriv ∈
{derivi, deriv+i | i = 1, . . . , 4} we have:
x ∈ out(N,A) iff (
∧
A0, x) ∈ deriv(N) for a finite A0 ⊆ A
The following proposition shows that the derivations of
the abstract normative systems are a subset of the derivations
of input/output logic, since T is derivable in out3 as follows:
(a, x)
(a, y)
SI
(a ∧ x, y)
CT
(a, y)
Likewise, AND and WO imply ⊥.
Proposition 3 For d ∈ {di, d+i | i = 1, . . . , 4} we have
that all derivations of d are derivations of the corresponding
deriv too.
We make some additional observations regarding the rela-
tion between the abstract normative systems and the instan-
tiation in unconstrained input/output logic:
• Theorem 1 looks different from Theorem 3, but note
that for the eight input/output logics we have x ∈
out(N, {a,>}) iff ∀A : out(N,A) = out(N ∪ {(a, x)}.
It seems that we cannot reformulate Theorem 1 in a sim-
ilar way as Theorem 3, since we do not have a counter-
part of conjunction in the theory of abstract normative
systems.
• For further symmetry we could have added a rule cor-
responding to WO to our abstract normative systems:
from (a, x) derive (a,>). Alternatively, we could have
included (>,>) in the basis of the proof system. In the se-
mantics, this corresponds to assuming that > is always in
the obligation set. The corresponding axiom in the modal
logic framework is that a tautology is always obligatory,
which has been criticized in the deontic logic literature.
We therefore do not adopt the principle that > should al-
ways be in the obligation set.
• The eight deontic operations for abstract normative
systems are distinct, whereas in input/output logic,
out+2 = out
+
4 (there is CT elimination in out
+
4 , since it
is derivable from all the other rules).
• Compactness plays an important role in input/output
logic, we have assumed finite abstract normative systems
in this paper (e.g. to prevent infinite chains in©3).
Note that neither in the input/output logic framework, nor
in the present abstract normative systems framework, we say
that a normative system “implies” a norm. Norms are used
to generate obligation sets, we can axiomatize deontic oper-
ations using a proof system based on conditionals, but this
does not mean that norms are “implied” or “derived.” The
most we can say is that a norm is “accepted” by a normative
system (van der Torre and Tan 1999), or “redundant” in a
normative system (van der Torre 2010).
The latter point may be related to two philosophical con-
siderations of the input/output logic framework. First, the
framework is based on the idea that norms do not have truth
values, known as Jorgensen’s dilemma in the deontic logic
literature (Jo¨rgensen 1937). Second, the role of logic is not to
create or determine a distinguished set of norms, but rather
to prepare information before it goes in as input to such
a normative code, to unpack output as it emerges and, if
needed, coordinate the two in certain ways. A set of con-
ditional norms is thus seen as a transformation device, and
the task of logic is to act as its “secretarial assistant” (Makin-
son and van der Torre 2000). See their papers for a further
discussion.
Finally, Stolpe (2008) introduces input/output operations
without WO, leading to the same abstract systems as above.
Dilemmas and CTD
As far as we know, no completeness results are known. In
deontic update semantics (van der Torre and Tan 1999), it
has been observed that analogues ofWO no longer hold, but
instead from (a, x) and (a, y) we can derive (a, x∨y). More-
over, instead of CT or T the following so-called CTA rule
holds: from (a, x) and (a∧x, y) derive (a, x∧y). Likewise,
in input/output logic WO, CT and T do not hold, and in
out3 CTA holds. In addition, the following so-called CTD
rule holds: from (a, x) and (x, y) derive (a, x→ y).
Permissions
Makinson and van der Torre provide completeness proofs
only for P 01 to P
0
3 , where they replace CT by the CTA rule,
which derives (a, x ∧ y) from (a, x) and (a ∧ x, y).
Makinson and van der Torre provide also completeness
proofs for so-called dynamic permissions. Since this is a rel-
atively complex operation, we leave that for further research.
Constitutive norms
Besides the algebraic cis approach of Lindahl and Odelstad,
two instatiations of constitutive norms are Jones and Ser-
got (1996)’s and Artosi et al. (2006)’s modal frameworks
for constitutive norms. The first is relatively weak and only
satisfies strengthening of the input and transitivity. The lat-
ter develops several logics, of which the so-called classifi-
catory interpretation is strong, in the sense that it satisfies
the same rules as ©+4 . The authors have argued that there
are some deeper similarities between their models. Indeed,
at the abstract level studied in this paper, they roughly satisfy
the same rules.
In this paper we are interested in the combination of con-
stitutive and regulative norms. Concerning logical architec-
tures, the combination of input/output logics has been pro-
posed by Makinson and van der Torre (2003b) under the
name of lions or logical input/output nets, but they have not
been studied formally.
Summary
In this paper, we introduce an easy to use graph based rea-
soning framework to classify and organize theories of nor-
mative reasoning. We are able to reproduce many subtle
variants of existing logics at the abstract level, including
many input/output logics, as summarized in Table 1. In to-
tal, we introduce eight concrete deontic operators with their
proof systems, two ways to introduce constraints for each of
these deontic operators, and two ways to introduce permis-
sions for each deontic operator, one with its proof systems.
Moreover, we introduce two ways to combine regulative and
constitutive norms.
Table 1: Proof systems for IOL and ANS operations
Output operation IOL deriv ANS di
Simple-minded {SI, WO, AND} {SI, ⊥}
Basic {SI, WO, AND}+{OR} {SI, ⊥}+{OR}
Reusable {SI, WO, AND}+{CT} {SI, ⊥}+{T}
Reusable basic {SI, WO, AND}+{OR,CT} {SI, ⊥}+{OR,T}
In the course of this paper, we have already indicated sev-
eral open problems. For example, we have to extend our
framework to cope with the issues discussed in the sec-
ond volume of the handbook (Gabbay et al. To appear b),
which covers time, action, norm change, epistemic norms,
games and more. Another topic for future research is to
study the relation between our abstract theory of normative
systems, and Dung (1995)’s abstract theory of argumenta-
tion. Though we share the motivation of providing a general
framework to classify concrete approaches, and we share the
methodology of graph reasoning, there are also substantial
differences. In particular, the notion of abstraction used in
Dung’s theory is of a different kind than the notion of ab-
straction used in this paper. An initial relation between in-
put/output logic and abstract argumentation has been shown
by Bochman (2005), using the input/output logic out4 to
represent causal reasoning, and represent argumentation in
the causal framework. The relation for our abstract theory is
also left for future research.
The work on abstract argumentation offers more inspira-
tion for further research on abstract normative systems. For
example, we may extend abstract normative systems with
higher order relations reflecting the addition or removal of
norms, as done in the reactive approach (Gabbay 2008),
or with preference or value patterns (Villata, Boella, and
van der Torre 2011a). Moreover, we may extend abstract
normative systems with other patterns for collective norms,
as in accrual of arguments, where elements together give rise
to new obligations, without doing so individually.
Another unexplored topic is the visualization of norma-
tive systems. The derivation of obligations, permissions and
institutional facts may be visualized by coloring the nodes,
or changing their shape. Inspired by attack semantics for
abstract argumentation (Villata, Boella, and van der Torre
2011b), we may emphasize the norms rather than the ele-
ments by visualizing the elements as points rather than cir-
cles, and coloring or changing the shape of the successful
norms.
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